


# LIBERAL NATIONALISTS CHARLES KERR

Charles Iain Kerr, first Baron Teviot, is best remembered for the eponymous agreement which he reached with Lord Woolton, the chairman of the Conservative Party, in 1947, by which Conservatives and Liberal Nationals regularised their constituency arrangements after more than a decade and a half of electoral cooperation. His political career, however, spanned four decades from the end of the First World War. **David Dutton** examines his life and career.

Charles  
Iain Kerr,  
First Baron  
Teviot  
(1874–1968)



# ONAL LEADER R, LORD TEVIOT

**K**ERR WAS born in 1874, the elder son of Charles Wyndham Rudolph Kerr, grandson of the sixth Marquess of Lothian. At the age of eighteen he left Britain to seek his fortune in Canada where he worked for three years as a miner. Later he went to South Africa where he also engaged in manual work. But on his return to London he became a stockbroker, rising eventually to become a senior partner in Kerr, Ware and Company. After service in the First World War, during which he was awarded the DSO and Military Cross and was mentioned in despatches, he embarked upon a political career. Family ties determined that he would seek advancement in the Liberal interest. His cousin, Philip Kerr, the eleventh Lord Lothian, had served as private secretary to Lloyd George and was active in Liberal politics throughout the inter-war years. But the 1920s were a difficult time for an aspiring Liberal politician and, like many others, Kerr struggled unsuccessfully to secure election to the House of Commons, as his party slipped inexorably into electoral third place, squeezed between the upper and nether millstones of its Conservative and Labour rivals. He contested Daventry in the general election of 1923 and came within

1,600 votes of victory. In the same constituency the following year (one of generally poor Liberal performance), Kerr came tantalisingly close to success, reducing the gap with his Tory opponent to just 200 votes. Then, in a by-election in Hull Central in 1926, occasioned by the defection of the sitting Liberal member, J. M. Kenworthy, to Labour, Kerr ended up in a distant third place, nearly 9,000 votes behind the Conservative runner-up. In this contest Kerr gave hints of what would become the central tenet of his political creed, his opposition to socialism. While the sort of Labour policies now espoused by Kenworthy were largely compatible with Liberal beliefs, Kerr argued that it was Labour's long-term objectives, upon which Kenworthy was conspicuously silent, which needed to be considered.<sup>1</sup> Throughout his career Kerr seemed to find it easier to say what was not Liberalism than what was, but at this stage, in his espousal of traditional Liberal causes such as free trade, he gave no indication that he was outside the party's mainstream. Finally, in what was, at least in terms of votes secured, a comparatively good Liberal year, he came within 650 votes of victory in Swansea West in the general election of 1929.

Such electoral disappointments seem to have persuaded Kerr to

transfer his attention to the sort of backstage organisational work for which his talents in any case best suited him, and he became chairman of the executive committee of the National Liberal Federation and of the Liberal Publications Department. Early in the new decade, however, Kerr had to confront the choice which faced all Liberals as the party once again split into two rival factions, divided by attitudes to the minority Labour government headed by Ramsay MacDonald and disagreements over the continuing relevance of the doctrine of free trade. For Kerr the choice was simple. A convinced anti-socialist, he allied himself in 1931 with John Simon's group of Liberal Nationals. Resigning all offices within the Liberal Party, he declared that he was 'so out of sympathy with the majority of the parliamentary party and the party organisation in their attitude of supporting the present Government, which I consider to be against the interests of the country and detrimental to the future of the party, that I do not wish to hold any position in the party machine and thereby either directly or indirectly support this policy'.<sup>2</sup> In a somewhat strange but revealing comment the *Manchester Guardian* noted at this time that Kerr had 'never been an assertive Liberal'.<sup>3</sup>

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## LIBERAL NATIONAL LEADER: CHARLES KERR, LORD TEVIOT

Simon made good use of his organisational abilities in constructing the new party, and the following year, with the elevation of Sir Robert Hutchison, another Liberal National defector, to the peerage, Kerr was selected as candidate for the by-election in Montrose Burghs. With a strong Liberal tradition, and in the absence of Tory intervention, it looked a safe seat. Hutchison had defeated his Labour opponent by more than 12,000 votes as recently as the general election of October 1931. This time the outcome was complicated by the arrival of a Scottish Nationalist candidate. Even so, the reduction of Kerr's majority to just 933 votes was a considerable disappointment: a reflection perhaps of a generally lack-lustre campaign on all sides, but a possible indication too that traditional Liberal voters were as yet unready to accept the Liberal Nationals as authentic exponents of their creed.<sup>4</sup>

Kerr's career as an MP was largely uneventful, though he did attract attention when moving the Address to the King's Speech in November 1934, dressed in the uniform of the Royal Company of Archers, the king's bodyguard in Scotland. His contributions to parliamentary debate were not always of the highest order. In his maiden speech in October 1932 he suggested resolving the unemployment problem by resettling the unemployed and their dependents in the underpopulated Dominions. This idea was being widely discussed at this time, but when, later in the same speech, he appealed to the Labour opposition to drop its censure motion on the government as a 'gesture of goodwill and cooperation', Kerr showed his inexperience.<sup>5</sup> But perhaps the most extreme example of what has been described as Kerr's 'mixture of eccentricity with naivety'<sup>6</sup> came when he addressed the Scottish Liberal National Association in May 1938. Here he spoke of a plot to unseat the government and unwisely coloured his remarks with racist overtones:

You would hardly credit the terrible, low-down, wicked efforts that are being made to undermine everything we hold dear. There are people in a very big way in this country who support Communism, though not outwardly. There is a lot of money

behind this, and I regret to say that a great bulk of the people working in that direction are of the Jewish race.<sup>7</sup>

Anti-Semitism was more widespread in those pre-Holocaust days than it has since become, but, with his vague suggestion of a Jewish conspiracy, Kerr was moving to a different plane. Not surprisingly, his remarks created an outcry – with Sir Maurice Block, chairman of the Glasgow Jewish Representative Council, insisting that his claims were 'utterly fantastic and untrue'. 'We naturally look to Colonel Kerr as a man of honour to substantiate his statement or make amends.'<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, Kerr wrote to *The Times* to explain, somewhat lamely, that he had merely been attacking the idea of Liberals working with Labour in a 'popular front' movement and that many of his best friends were Jews.<sup>9</sup> After a few days' reflection, however, Kerr was obliged to issue an unqualified apology:

I have come to the conclusion that under the circumstances I had no right whatever in my remarks on the Communist and anti-God movements to refer to the Jews. Doing so has created a completely wrong impression, and I now express my sincere regret at having done so.<sup>10</sup>

But were Kerr's remarks merely a case of extreme political ineptitude? It is striking that his sentiments and even his vocabulary – for example, the phrase 'anti-God' to describe communist activity – bore a striking resemblance to those being voiced at this time by the notorious Captain Archibald Ramsay, Conservative MP for Peebles and South Midlothian, a crypto-fascist who was rapidly emerging as one of Hitler's leading apologists in Britain and the only sitting MP to be imprisoned in 1940 under Defence Regulation 18B. Interestingly, Ramsay's home, Kellie Castle, was situated inside Kerr's parliamentary constituency. More significantly, there is a suggestion that a meeting in London referred to in Kerr's speech, from which he had derived his information about the 'Judaeo-Bolshevik' danger, had been attended by Ramsay.<sup>11</sup> The two men were associated in the United

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Christian Front and, the following year, Kerr, along with several former members of the British Union of Fascists, joined Ramsay's so-called 'Right Club', a 'stage army of increasingly desperate fascists and pro-Nazis'.<sup>12</sup> There is no evidence that Kerr's dalliance with the far-right went any further than this. Yet it is difficult to deny that he had travelled a long way from the original Liberal affiliation under which he had entered the political arena.

For all that, it was Kerr's organisational skills rather than his inner political beliefs that carried forward his political career, and he was an obvious choice for the position of Liberal National chief whip following the unexpected death of Sir James Blindell in 1937. This promotion carried with it the junior post of Lord Commissioner of the Treasury in the National Government. He was promoted to be Comptroller of HM Household early in 1939 but, at much the same time, announced that he would not be defending his seat at the next general election, widely anticipated for that year, for reasons of health. Kerr was sixty-five years old and had experienced some health problems at the turn of the year. But the fact that he lived on comfortably into his tenth decade gives some credence to the contemporary suspicion that other factors were involved. *The Fascist* dropped clear hints that his retirement was related to his apparently anti-Semitic remarks of a year earlier.<sup>13</sup> None the less, with the prospect of a general election postponed for the duration of hostilities, Kerr was elevated to the peerage in June 1940 as Baron Teviot. Later that year he was elected to succeed Lord Hutchison as chairman of the Liberal National Organisation.<sup>14</sup>

For the remainder of the Second World War Teviot performed the sort of patriotic good works that might have been expected of a semi-retired politician supporting Churchill's coalition government. He visited China in 1942 as a member of a cross-party delegation and was clearly impressed by what he saw, telling a Liberal National lunch on his return in March 1943 that 'the Chinese people were being prepared to accept a new constitution which perhaps would be the best democratic organisation in the world, and from which we, with our old-fashioned democracy,

might learn something'.<sup>15</sup> Later that year he chaired an inter-departmental committee set up to consider and report on the progressive stages by which, 'having regard for the number of practising dentists, provision for an adequate and satisfactory dental service should be made available for the population'.<sup>16</sup> Reporting in 1944, Teviot's committee unanimously recommended that a comprehensive dental service should be an integral part of an overall National Health Service. It was a significant contribution to the planning of the post-war welfare state.

As the war neared its end, attention inevitably refocused on the domestic political agenda. The years of conflict had been particularly damaging for the organisational infrastructure of the smaller political parties, and the Liberal Nationals faced the additional difficulty that the circumstances and attitudes which had brought them into existence in the early 1930s had become a matter of history rather than current politics. Teviot, however, became one of the strongest advocates, particularly after Labour's landslide victory in the general election of 1945, of the idea that the threat of socialism in Britain compelled Liberals and Conservatives to join forces in opposition to this alien political tradition. First, it was necessary to see whether the divided forces of Liberalism could be reunited – but only on this limiting basis which in practice precluded independent Liberal action. Teviot believed that a number of Liberals, dissatisfied with the performance of the parliamentary Liberal Party, might come over to the Liberal Nationals in the 'not so distant future'. For that reason it was necessary to play down links with the Conservatives for the time being in case such an association frightened away potential Liberal defectors.<sup>17</sup>

Two sets of negotiations were held in 1943–4 and in 1946, in which Teviot played a prominent part. In the circumstances, the talks went on longer than the basic situation merited, encouraged perhaps by a strong feeling within many constituencies that reunion must be the way forward. Both sides seemed reluctant to admit that the question of Liberal independence, which for Liberal Nationals would mean severing their links with the Conservative Party and therefore exposing

themselves to probable electoral suicide, posed an insuperable hurdle. In the last resort this was not a step that Teviot was prepared to contemplate. By the last months of 1946 it was clear that Liberal reunion was a non-starter and that he would need to pursue a different option of even closer association with the Conservatives.

By this time, of course, the Liberal Nationals had suffered a considerable reverse as a result of the 1945 general election, their House of Commons strength reduced to just eleven unequivocal adherents. In the negotiations which now began, with Teviot leading for the Liberal Nationals and Lord Woolton for the Conservatives, the latter held almost all of the cards. The Conservative chairman brushed aside Teviot's complaint that it was a pity to find Conservative candidates being adopted in what he considered to be traditional Liberal National seats, and he effectively put a gun to the head of the smaller party. Woolton suggested that jobs might be found for competent Liberal Nationals in the Conservative organisation but, 'if they delayed for two or three months, I should have completed my staff and would then undertake no obligation in the event of amalgamation'.<sup>18</sup> The Conservatives were fully aware of the weakness of the Liberal National position, while the latter knew that, the longer they delayed, the more their residual strength up and down the country was likely to be eroded. In such circumstances agreement was soon reached and the terms of the Woolton–Teviot pact were announced in May 1947.

The agreement probably offered Liberal Nationals as much as Teviot could have reasonably expected. On the one hand the position in the constituencies, where the Liberal National organisational infrastructure was often crumbling or already dormant, was regularised. In those where Liberal Nationals and Conservatives both had an existing organisation, a combined association should be formed under a jointly agreed title. Where only one of the parties had an organisation, encouragement should be given to all potential members, from either tradition, on the basis of joint action against socialism. And the selection of parliamentary candidates should be based on a joint list drawn

up in consultation by the two parties' headquarters. Successful candidates would sit in parliament as Liberal-Unionists, a somewhat strange title given the fate of a similarly named group which had disappeared from the political landscape just before the First World War. All of this guaranteed the survival in the immediate future of Liberal Nationalism as a concept, even if the outlook in the longer term suggested probable absorption by the big battalions of the Conservative Party. At a national level Liberal National prospects looked a little brighter with structures such as the Liberal National Organisation, the Liberal National Council and the annual conference carrying on much as before. The Liberal National Party thus retained the form, appearance and structure of a national movement with officers and finances separate from those of the Tories. Teviot, then, still had a political party to help manage. Indeed, there were those who believed that the very fact that he enjoyed being the chairman of a political party was an important factor in keeping the movement in existence.<sup>19</sup>

Other Liberal Nationals, however, were more inclined to accept the logic of the situation and amalgamate fully with the Conservatives. After all, if the modern Conservative Party was as liberalised as Liberal Nationals repeatedly claimed, what was the point of maintaining even the semblance of a separate identity? John Simon, now like Teviot in the House of Lords, was one of their number. There, he accepted the Conservative whip, sat on the opposition front bench and even attended some meetings of Churchill's Consultative Committee, the shadow cabinet of the day. In the wake of the 1945 general election Teviot had become Liberal National whip in the upper chamber, but his task was not an easy one. By 1949 there were, in theory, still thirteen peers in receipt of the National Liberal whip. The problem, however, was that the group was predominantly elderly and, as Teviot admitted, 'with very few exceptions ... our people hardly ever attend and there are many days when [Simon] and I are the only National Liberals there'. And even Teviot's presence could not be taken for granted: 'I

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try and get there as much as I can, and take part in debates on occasions, but my attempt to earn my living must come first and I am very busy in this direction'. This gave a considerable advantage to the mainstream Liberal Party in its ongoing efforts to undermine the National Liberals' claims to legitimacy and viability. The former 'appear to have a lot of people with nothing else to do but attend the House of Lords'.<sup>20</sup> This was not a picture that the elderly and hard-pressed Lord Samuel, leading the mainstream party in the upper chamber, would have recognised. Both Liberal factions were in fact struggling to maintain a presence in the House of Lords. After the 1945 general election Lord Salisbury, Conservative leader in the upper house, had suggested that National Liberal peers should take the Conservative whip. But it remained Teviot's view that it was best to retain this token of independence, not least because it contradicted the Liberals' claim that the National Liberals had been swallowed up by the Conservative Party. In response to Simon's suggestion that the next general election might be the time to bite the bullet and accept full amalgamation with the Tories, Teviot remained non-committal: 'we will just have to deal with this fence when we get to it'.<sup>21</sup> In practice the two men had to agree to differ. Simon 'admire[d] very much [Teviot's] public spirit in sticking to your task as Chairman of the Organisation', but could give no absolute assurances as to his own future actions. 'So far, I have made my contribution in council and debate without any formal change of name. But I would not like you to think that I am pledging myself to continue indefinitely in this ambiguous position.'<sup>22</sup>

Teviot retained his posts within the National Liberal hierarchy until September 1956. In the intervening years he was probably his party's most prominent spokesman, restating repeatedly and consistently, if not entirely convincingly, the justification for the National Liberals' continuing existence.<sup>23</sup> It was, he insisted, the threat of socialism which made common action between Liberals and Conservatives imperative.<sup>24</sup> By the late 1940s this argument carried some weight. The Conservatives made a huge effort to overturn Labour's parliamentary

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majority in the general election of February 1950. Their narrow failure to do so was widely attributed to the intervention of as many as 475 independent Liberal candidates. Persuading Liberal voters to join the effort to unseat Labour was therefore central to the election campaign of October 1951, especially as the Liberals now restricted their challenge to just 109 seats. But Teviot's intervention was bound to irritate the proudly independent Liberal Party headed by Clement Davies. 'In view of your Broadcast and the Liberal Manifesto', he told Davies,

it appears that there is no fundamental difference between the Liberal and Conservative ideas. Because of the serious crisis through which our country is going, and the great danger to our future if a Socialist Government is again returned, with great respect I suggest to you that there is a great opportunity here to enhance the Liberal position in the country, and that all Liberals in constituencies where there is no Liberal candidate should be urged to vote for the candidate who is 100 per cent against Socialism, which is anathema to Liberalism.<sup>25</sup>

The Liberal Party, however, was not to be so easily seduced. Indeed, some Liberals such as Megan Lloyd George regarded the Tories rather than Labour as their mortal foe. Furthermore, it was by no means clear that, in the Conservative attempt to attract the Liberal vote, the existence of the National Liberals as a separate entity was any particular asset. As a result the Tories pursued something of a dual strategy. If the presence of candidates from joint National Liberal and Conservative local associations, sporting hybrid party affiliations, attracted votes that straightforward Tories would have struggled to secure, all well and good. But at the same time the Conservatives sought to woo the Liberal Party directly, a policy that culminated in Churchill's unsuccessful offer of ministerial office to Clement Davies in the wake of the 1951 general election victory. Bilateral negotiations between the Tories and the independent Liberals inevitably caused Teviot considerable concern.

'Rumours are spreading all over the place', he once complained, 'and I am in a very awkward position ... all I can say to those who are continually ringing up is that I know nothing, the answer to that is "Well you ought to".'<sup>26</sup>

After 1951, of course, Teviot's stance needed a subtly different emphasis. The socialist 'threat' had visibly receded and he now stressed the importance of the National Liberals, or more accurately the Liberal-Unionist contingent in the House of Commons, in keeping Churchill's government on broadly progressive and 'Liberal' lines. Nineteen MPs had been elected under a somewhat confusing variety of labels, a convenient figure granted that the government's overall majority in the new parliament was just seventeen seats, giving Teviot's group the rather spurious claim that they were 'holding the balance'. Writing in 1955, Teviot spelt out the importance of his parliamentary colleagues:

The function of the group is to consider at its weekly meetings short- and long-term policy, with particular regard for the point of view of those Liberals throughout the country who believe that in today's political conditions Liberal principles must be constantly stressed, but can only be translated into effective policy by working in full alliance with one of the major parties. Socialism is the negation of Liberal principles, whereas the [Conservative] Government's record of achievement since 1951 is one to which any Liberal could be proud to have contributed.

Still, though, Teviot drew back from formal amalgamation:

The fact that National Liberals have established a method of expressing their political views in constructive government does not mean that they should sacrifice their identity either in the constituencies or in Parliament. There are very real advantages to the nation in maintaining a distinctive channel through which the flow of Liberal and Conservative thought can be brought together. We would respectfully suggest that the National Liberal Council outside Parliament and the Liberal-Unionist group within provide what the



independent Liberal party cannot, a means of making Liberalism a continuing and effective force in our national life.<sup>27</sup>

Teviot was eighty-two when he stepped down from the chairmanship of the National Liberal Organisation. He continued to make occasional contributions to Lords debates for the next five years or so. His style was to be brief and to the point. Many of his interventions seemed designed to hold back the mounting tide of permissive and liberal reform. At the end of one short speech on the Commonwealth Immigration Bill of 1962 – which proved in fact to be his last parliamentary performance – he declared: ‘As your Lordships know, I never speak for long: I always just state my case and then sit down, which I am going to do now.’<sup>28</sup> His brevity could at times be his undoing, with his bald and unadorned statements leaving him open to criticism or ridicule. In 1960, in a debate on crime and punishment, he asked the Lords to consider the possibility of making the death penalty match the actual crime that had been committed. This, he argued, would serve as a real deterrent.<sup>29</sup> But Lord Chorley, who spoke immediately after Teviot, found his words ‘really quite fantastic’. Was it seriously being proposed that a killer found guilty of murder by stabbing should himself be stabbed? Did Teviot truly believe that any public executioner could be found, prepared to carry out such a sentence?<sup>30</sup> But it was in a debate following the trial of Penguin Books for the publication of D. H. Lawrence’s celebrated novel, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, in 1960, that Teviot gave full vent to his reactionary views. He was appalled by the jury’s decision that the publishers should go unpunished. The book was a ‘disgusting, filthy affront to ordinary decencies’, ‘far worse than anything that I could possibly have thought could be published in this country’.<sup>31</sup> Its portrayal of sexual love and emotions disgusted him, for if love ‘is abused it seems to me that it becomes the work of Satan, indecent and quite dreadful’.<sup>32</sup> For good measure Teviot used the occasion to condemn the Wolfenden Report of 1957, which had recommended the legalisation of homosexual acts between consenting adults – ‘to which I equally take the greatest

exception’. ‘What are we coming to?’ he asked, accompanied by the laughter of one unnamed peer.<sup>33</sup> Teviot’s words now seem to belong to another age, but there is no doubt that he spoke for a substantial body of public opinion at the time.

Teviot died in London on 7 January, 1968 at the age of ninety-three. He thus almost survived to see the end of the political party in which he had spent the overwhelming majority of his career. The National Liberal Council was wound up on 14 May 1968 and its accumulated funds were transferred to the Conservatives. For all of that career, however, he had borne the title of ‘Liberal’ in one guise or another.

His case prompts several conclusions. The Liberal Party which Teviot joined after the First World War was an extremely broad church, containing both radicals who moved easily towards Labour and traditionalists who found much that was congenial in the Conservative Party of Stanley Baldwin, and its internal cohesion and unity were under severe strain long before the final parting of the ways in 1931–2. Teviot’s ‘liberalism’, such as it was, related largely to concepts of sound finance, small budgets and limited government. Towards the end of the Second World War he was criticised for his warnings about the size of the nation’s budget, even though it was difficult to see how this could be avoided in the context of the global conflict. ‘The progressive increase in the Budget’, insisted *The Times*, ‘twice accelerated by world wars in which the State itself is necessarily the great consumer and spender, is the mark of an inevitable evolution.’ These ‘formidable totals’ represented ‘a redistribution’.<sup>34</sup> Teviot did not live long enough to see such thinking as that put forward by *The Times* challenged by the New Right of the 1970s and 1980s.

On social matters, the majority of his views were conservative, reactionary even, if not necessarily Conservative. After one particularly blimpish speech in the House of Lords in which he had railed against unaccountable television ‘personalities’ who interviewed senior Cabinet ministers on programmes such as *Panorama* and called for more governmental control of such activities, the maverick Tory peer, Lord Boothby, interjected, ‘And the noble Lord is

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a Liberal’.<sup>35</sup> It was an appropriate, disbelieving comment not just on Teviot’s speech, but on his whole career. For all that, as the joint architect of the 1947 agreement with Lord Woolton, he helped ensure that the National Liberal tradition survived, in however attenuated a form, for twenty years more than might otherwise have been the case.

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- 1 *Manchester Guardian*, 26 Nov. 1926.
- 2 Kerr to Arthur Brampton, president of the National Liberal Federation, 30 Apr. 1931; *Manchester Guardian*, 9 May 1931.
- 3 *Manchester Guardian*, 9 May 1931.
- 4 The full result was: Kerr (Lib Nat) 7,963; T. Kennedy (Lab) 7,030; D. Emslie (Scot Nat) 1,996. Kerr increased his majority to 8,566 in the general election of 1935 in a straight fight with Labour.
- 5 House of Commons Debates, 5<sup>th</sup> Series, vol. 269, cols. 858–61. The leader of the Liberal Party, Herbert Samuel, welcomed Kerr as a ‘personal friend’, regretting only that he was not ‘in even closer political association than is the case as yet’. *Ibid.*, col. 861.
- 6 M. Pottle, ‘Charles Iain Kerr, first Baron Teviot’ in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 31 (OUP, 2004), p. 411.
- 7 *Manchester Guardian*, 28 May 1938.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *The Times*, 28 May 1938.
- 10 *Manchester Guardian*, 31 May 1938.
- 11 R. Griffiths, *Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsay, the Right Club and British Anti-Semitism 1939–40* (Constable, 1998), pp. 83–5.
- 12 M. Pugh, ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’ *Fascists and Fascism in Britain between the Wars* (Pimlico, 2006), p. 281.
- 13 *The Fascist*, June 1939, cited in Griffiths, *Patriotism Perverted*, p. 149.
- 14 *The Times*, 7 Aug. 1940.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 25 Mar. 1943.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 14 Aug. 1943.
- 17 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Archive, CCO 3/1/64, notes of meeting at 24 Old Queen Street, 21 Mar. 1946.
- 18 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Woolton MSS 21, fos. 52–3, memorandum of conversation with Teviot and William Mabane 25 Oct. 1946.

*concluded on page 27*

- Selected Papers*, 2006, ed. Frederick C. Schneid and Denise Davidson (High Point University Press, 2007).
- 4 Coppock has received almost no historical attention. There is the *Dictionary of National Biography* written by Albert Nicholson, revised by H. C. G. Matthew in 2004 (<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6279>), but little more than a mention in other historical works. The one work published by the man himself was a manual of electors' rights, *The Electors Manual of Plain Direction by Which Every Man May Know His Own Rights and Reservations* (Finsbury Reform Club, 1835).
- 5 2 Will. IV c. 45, 738, clause 56; see Salmon, *Electoral Reform at Work*, pp. 20–25.
- 6 2 Will. IV c. 45, 729–738.
- 7 See Joseph Parkes, *The Governing Charter of the Borough of Warwick, 5 William and Mary, 18 March 1694, with a Letter to the Burgesses on the Past and Present State of the Corporation* (Birmingham, 1827).
- 8 The Parkes and Melbourne manuscripts reveal a few significant letters in May 1832 between the men, discussing ways in which the BPU's actions could be softened. See Parkes MSS, University College London and Melbourne MSS, British Library.
- 9 Minutes of Evidence, 9 March 1840, in *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections and on Election Proceedings and Expenses: With Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, 1834–44* (Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers, Government, Elections, 2; Irish Academic Press, 1970), p. 558.
- 10 Parkes MSS, Parkes to Durham, 21 July 1835. For more details on the creation of the Reform Club, see the Parkes MSS throughout second half of 1835; Tennyson MSS, TED H/31/14, Parkes to Tennyson, 20 June 1835; Parkes MSS, University College Library, Parkes to Stanley, 14 October 1835; Durham MSS, Lambton Castle, Memorandum by Molesworth on the Formation of the Reform Club, 7 February 1836.
- 11 Philips and Wetherall, 'The Great Reform Act and the Modernization of England', pp. 413–14.
- 12 Brougham MSS, 20,959, Parkes to Brougham, 28 September 1833.
- 13 Parkes MSS, Parkes to W. Hutt, M.P. (copy enclosed to Lord Stanley), 19 August 1838.
- 14 Salmon, *Electoral Reform Act Work*, p. 22. This revises estimates previously offered by Michael Brock, *The Great Reform Act* (HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 1973), p. 312 and Frank O'Gorman, *Voters, Patrons and Parties, The Unreformed of Hanoverian England, 1734–1832* (Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 179.
- 15 2 Will. IV c. 45, 729–738.
- 16 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Election Petitions Recognizances, *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 541.
- 17 Henry James Perry and Jerome William Knapp, *Cases of Converted Elections in the Eleventh Parliament of the United Kingdom; Being the First since the Passing of Acts for the Amendment of the Representation of the People* (J. & W. T. Clarke, 1833).
- 18 For a detailed assessment of this particular case in Warwick and its impact on both electoral practice and the beginnings of Municipal Corporation Reform, in which Parkes played a part as Secretary to the Select Parliamentary Municipal Corporation Reform Commission, see my article "'With All My Oldest and Native Friends'". Joseph Parkes, Warwickshire Solicitor and Electoral Agent in Age of Reform,' in Nancy LoPatin-Lummis (ed.), *Public Life and Public Lives: Politics and Religion in Modern British History*, p. 96–108.
- 19 *Annual Register*, (1833), ch. VIII, pp. 211–12.
- 20 *Parliamentary Papers* (1833), IV, pp. 633–4; XI, p. 197; *The Times*, 6 August, 1834, p. 3.
- 21 *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 469.
- 22 This was certainly the case in Warwick. Parkes directly asked Edward Ellice, who in turn raised the funds with Lord Durham, for a £1,000 to cover court costs. Lambton MSS, Parkes to Ellice, 15 April 1834.
- 23 *Ibid.*, Parkes to Durham, 9 March 1836.
- 24 *Ibid.*, Parkes to Durham, 2 February 1836; Parkes to Durham, 1 March 1836.
- 25 *Ibid.*, Durham to Parkes, 20 March 1836.
- 26 Jerome William Knapp and Edward Ombler, *Cases of Converted Elections in the Twelfth Parliament of the United Kingdom; Being the Second since the Passing of Acts for the Amendment of the Representation of the People* (London: 1837).
- 27 Henry Stooks Smith, *Register of Parliamentary Contested Elections* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1842), p. 29.
- 28 Coppock, *The Electors Manual*, p. 12.
- 29 Stooks Smith, *Register of Parliamentary Contested Elections*, p. 7.
- 30 *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 468.
- 31 Coppock, *The Electors Manual*, pp. 12–13.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 725.
- 34 Thomas Falconer and Edward Fitzherbert, *Cases of Controverted Elections, Determined in Committees of the House of Commons in the Second Parliament of the Reign of Queen Victoria* (Saunders and Benning, 1839).
- 35 William Wardell Bean, *Parliamentary Representation of Six Northern Counties of England from 1603 to 1886* (C. H. Bamwell, 1890), p. 435.
- 36 William Retlaw Williams, *Parliamentary History of the County of Oxford including the City and University* (Brecknock, 1899), p. 225.
- 37 Falconer and Fitzherbert, *Cases of Controverted Elections*.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 Hobhouse MSS British Library Add MSS, 36,471, f. 379, Coppock to Hobhouse, 14 March 1838.
- 41 Broughton MSS, British Library Add MSS 36,472, f. 81, Coppock to Broughton, 21 September 1837.
- 42 For more on this, see my article, 'The Reform Club and the creation of the Liberal Party' in a forthcoming special edition of the journal *Parliamentary History*.
- 43 *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 727.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 728.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 723.
- 46 There is nothing to suggest how Coppock arrived at this figure in his testimony before the select committee, but his fundraising efforts within the Reform Club, as well as Parkes's nervousness about the state of funding and correspondence with Ellice and others, render the hefty amount plausible.
- 47 *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 728.
- 48 Minutes of Evidence take before the Select Committee on Election Petitions Recognizances, *Reports from Select Committees on Controverted Elections*, p. 541.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 Parkes MSS, Folder 8, Bright to Parkes, 26 June 1857.

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- 19 Conservative Party Archive, CCO 3/1/63, Col. P. J. Blair to Sir Arthur Young 15 Jun. 1949. For more details of the evolution of the Woolton–Teviot agreement, see D. Dutton, *Liberals in Schism: A History of the National Liberal Party* (I.B.Tauris, 2008), pp. 157–66.
- 20 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Simon MSS 98, fos. 6–7, Teviot to Simon, 27 Jul. 1949.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 *Ibid.*, fos. 3–5, Simon to Teviot, 26 Jul. 1949.
- 23 The party formally changed its name to National Liberal in 1948.
- 24 *The Times*, 19 Nov. 1949.
- 25 National Library of Wales, Davies MSS, J/3/58, Teviot to Davies, 4 Oct. 1951.
- 26 Woolton MSS 21, fo. 116, Teviot to Woolton, 19 Sep. 1950.
- 27 Teviot and J. Maclay to *The Times*, 7 Jun. 1955.
- 28 House of Lords Debates, vol. 238, col. 63.
- 29 *Ibid.*, vol. 225, cols. 473–4.
- 30 *Ibid.*, col. 475.
- 31 *Ibid.*, vol. 227, col. 530.
- 32 *Ibid.*, col. 529.
- 33 *Ibid.*, col. 528.
- 34 *The Times*, 26 Oct. 1944.
- 35 House of Lords Debates, vol. 216, cols. 601–2.