LLOYD GEORGE'S WAR

Lloyd George's reputation as a master rhetorician is well deserved. Never keen on writing, the spoken word was his perfect medium.[1] When he was at the height of his powers, he was as effective in winning over opponents face to face in private as he was at making emotive, populist appeals to large crowds and at winning over MPs in the House of Commons. **Richard Toye** demonstrates the importance of Lloyd George's rhetorical skills during the First World War, and analyses how his speeches combined *ethos* (character), *pathos* (emotion), and *logos* (logic or discourse). Toye concludes by calling for a more systematic study of the origins, delivery and reception of the rhetoric of a brilliant war leader.

During the First World War, Lloyd George's rhetorical skills were important for a variety of reasons. They helped him justify the war to the British public and to international audiences; they helped establish his own reputation as a dynamic war leader, paving the way for his entry to 10 Downing Street; they helped maintain him as Prime Minister at times of political vulnerability; and they helped secure his massive victory in the general election of 1918. They were, furthermore, an important component of the 'prime ministerial' or 'semi-presidential' form of government which he pioneered, in contrast to earlier, more collective styles of Cabinet government.[2]

RHETORIC, 1914 – 1918

Surprisingly, though, Lloyd George's war rhetoric has received rather little scholarly attention, certainly by comparison with Churchill's during the Second World War.[3] Of course, his many biographers have written about his speechmaking, often to excellent effect, and there is plenty of other literature that touches upon it, at least in passing. His pre-war and post-war rhetoric has been discussed in a useful way by Iain McLean.[4] Kenneth O. Morgan's recent lecture on Lloyd George as a parliamentarian contains many important insights into his rhetorical skills.[5] However, in spite of valuable contributions by L. Brooks Hill and David R. Woodward, we lack a systematic account of his rhetoric throughout the 1914–18 period as a whole.[6] That is a much larger task than can be attempted in an article of this length. It is, however, possible to examine some key developments and episodes which cast light on broader themes. In examining these, it is helpful to bear in mind the three Classical rhetorical appeals: to *ethos* (character), to *pathos* (emotion, or the emotional character of the audience), and to *logos* (logic or discourse). Considering how Lloyd George's speeches made use of varying combinations of these appeals helps us to understand his undoubted rhetorical success.

By the time that war broke out, Lloyd George was, of course, an extremely experienced orator, with nearly twenty-five years in parliament behind him. Much of what he knew about public speaking came from the nonconformist chapel tradition. Although he was no conventional Christian, his unselfconscious use of religiously infused language was an asset for a radical politician who wanted to establish a reputation for high-minded moral fervour, and his war speeches too had an evangelical flavour.[7] But he was also influenced by the culture of the music hall, hence his ability – noted by Morgan – to move swiftly between moral injunction and knockabout humour.[8]

When he became an MP, in 1890, Gladstone was still Liberal leader. In old age, he recalled: 'I learned from Gladstone that to be effective in attack you must confine yourself to one subject on a narrow front.'[9] And, for a long time, it was attack that he was best at. This was true, of course, of his eloquent denunciations of the Boer War. It was also true of his subsequent peacetime career as a Cabinet minister. Peel had used the technique of 'government in Opposition' – the responsible pose of the would-be Prime Minister. Lloyd George and his fellow Liberal Winston Churchill instead performed 'Opposition in government', launching scathing attacks on the landed elite in order to whip up support for radical social policies. It was the former, arguably, who was the more effective of the two. Robert Roberts, chronicler of working-class life in Salford, recalled how his father and a friend idolised Lloyd George but thought little of Churchill: 'Unlike their hero, the orator supreme, they considered him a shifty and mediocre speaker with a poor delivery.'[10] On the other hand, Lloyd George's brilliant efforts, which contained elements of improvisation, were thought to lack the literary quality needed to read well in the papers the next day.[11] Reputedly, it was his *eminence grise*, *News of the World* proprietor Lord Riddell, who persuaded him to reserve his most important speeches for Saturdays to ensure that they would receive coverage in the Saturday evening papers, the Sunday papers, and the Monday ones too:

> When newspaper reporters appealed to L.G. that if the speeches were made in the afternoon they would clash with the foot-ball news L.G. said 'when would you like them – 11 o'clock in the morning?' On their saying 'yes' he did his best to ensure that he should speak in some conference or at the laying of some memorial stone or in some great factory at that hour on Saturday; furthermore, he undertook to provide them with a draft of his speech the previous day, subject only to the variation which new events or new inspiration might bring forth.[12]

Lloyd George's rhetorical methods generated much suspicion, of course. His famous speech in the Limehouse district of East London in defence of his tax-raising Budget of 1909 was seen by opponents as an effort to stir up class warfare; 'Limehousing' became a byword for rabble-rousing and demagoguery. During the war, however, the sense that he was authentically in touch with the mood of the people gave him a public *ethos* that many other politicians lacked. Similarly, as a former pro-Boer (although never actually a pacifist) Lloyd George was in some ways an unlikely advocate of war. This could also be turned into a strength, though. Having consistently opposed large-scale arms spending before 1914, and having been converted to British intervention on the Continent only at the very last minute, no one could reasonably accuse him of being a warmonger. Nor, in fact, was it easy to accuse him of hypocrisy. His famous warning to Germany at the time of the Agadir crisis in 1911 stood as a marker of his willingness to defend the European balance of power and the British national interest. His brand of Liberalism was also associated with the defence of the rights of small nations, which the German invasion of Belgium seemed to violate spectacularly.

Left:
Lloyd George during the First World War
(Photograph by kind permission of Llyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru/The National Library of Wales.)

In the first autumn of the war, then, Lloyd George's carefully cultivated public character was almost perfectly pitched. He could be seen as someone who had pursued peace up to the final moment, but who had reluctantly concluded that participation in the war was necessary, in line with his known commitment to use force, *in extremis*, to protect Britain's honour. Who better, then, to win over waverers, for if even he supported the war, who else could possibly object? And there was, perhaps, more of a need to convert doubters than has traditionally been allowed. The standard picture of August 1914 is of widespread war enthusiasm, with men rushing mindlessly to join up before it was all over. Catriona Pennell has recently shown, however, that things were much more complex, with people often taking weeks to mull over what they knew were momentous, life-changing decisions.[13] This means that, in the early weeks, leading public figures had a potential role to play in cementing public attitudes.

His speech at the Queen's Hall in the West End on 19 September 1914 was a landmark. It was printed and circulated widely and was received with great enthusiasm by the press. The audience consisted primarily of the London Welsh and the purpose was recruitment. Lloyd George was able to deploy *ethos* by playing on his own Welsh background, which also served another purpose. As Bentley Gilbert has pointed out, he was in the midst of a battle to persuade Kitchener, the War Secretary, to allow the creation of a specifically Welsh army corps: 'A strong response to his call for men would be proof that an appeal for Welsh recruits could be made on a national basis.'[14] The speech was an attempt to demonstrate that the war was being fought on behalf of Liberal values, including the rights of the 'little nations', specifically Belgium and Serbia, but also, by implication, Wales. Lloyd George also sought to show that the war could not have been avoided 'without national dishonour'. This could be seen, superficially as a purely emotive appeal; but he also used *logos* in order to argue that national honour was fundamental to the proper working of international relations, notwithstanding the fact that many crimes had been committed in its name. Britain's treaty commitment to Belgium represented a solemn duty. The alternative to fulfilling it was to adopt the German view of treaties as mere scraps of paper that could be violated if they conflicted with national interest. The *Times* report shows how he used a combination of humour and rhetorical questions to work up his audience to fever pitch:

> The whole house burst into laughter when Mr. Lloyd George asked: 'Have you any £5 notes about you; or any of those neat little Treasury £1 notes?' But the mood changed when he went on to exclaim:- 'If you have burn them; they are only scraps of paper!' And there were fierce cheers in response to his telling questions and answers:- 'What are they made of? – Rags. What are they worth? – The whole credit of the British Empire.'[15]

The speech's peroration was dominated by *pathos*. It centred on a metaphor from his Welsh boyhood. He had, he said, known a beautiful valley between the mountains and the sea, 'sheltered by the mountains from all the bitter blasts' of the wind, and therefore snug and comfortable, but 'very enervating'. The British people had, he said, been living in a sheltered valley for generations.

> We have been too comfortable and too indulgent, many, perhaps, too selfish, and the stern hand of fate has scourged us to an elevation where we can see the everlasting things that matter for a nation – the great peaks we had forgotten, of Honour, Duty, Patriotism, and, clad in glittering white, the towering pinnacle of Sacrifice pointing like a rugged finger to Heaven. We shall descend into the valleys again; but as long as the men and women of this generation last, they will carry in their hearts the image of those mighty peaks whose foundations are not shaken, though Europe rock and sway in the convulsions of a great war.[16]

As John Grigg has pointed out, Lloyd George's claim that he envied young people their 'opportunity' to fight sat uncomfortably with his private desire to keep his own sons out of harm's way. He used his influence to get them positions as aides-de-camp to generals (although they both later undertook more dangerous service).[17] Had this become known at the time it would have seriously damaged his *ethos* – as indeed would the knowledge that his secretary Frances Stevenson was also his mistress.

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That, of course, was a closely guarded secret at the time, although Stevenson's name did gain some public prominence as the editor (or 'arranger') of a volume of Lloyd George's speeches published in 1915. By the time the book came out, he was well established in his new position as Minister of Munitions. That post had been created in May that year as part of the political shake-up triggered partly by the shortage of shells and partly by Churchill's problems at the Admiralty. With a coalition government now in place, Lloyd George's role in increasing production augmented his reputation as a man of drive and determination – but without his speeches his administrative ability might have counted for less with the public. One contemporary commentator described Lloyd George's lifetime technique – applicable in both war and peace – as follows:

> Provide a cry which is, or can be made, popular.
>
> Promote a popular movement for its effective prosecution.
>
> Inspire that movement with enthusiasm by a great platform campaign.[18]

The contrast with the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, was striking. Asquith did not merely appear (perhaps somewhat unfairly) as a weak hand on the tiller and an advocate of 'wait and see'; he also failed to articulate as clearly as Lloyd George the moral case for war. Lloyd George's speeches in favour of conscription in the winter of 1915-–6 accentuated the differences between the two men (although it should also be noted that his address to munitions workers on Clydeside on Christmas Day met such hostility that he attempted to suppress news of what had happened.)[19] In

a famous Commons speech he said that the words 'too late' were 'two fatal words of this War':

> Too late in moving here. Too late in arriving there. Too late in coming to this decision. Too late in starting with enterprises. Too late in preparing. In this War the footsteps of the Allied forces have been dogged by the mocking spectre of 'Too Late'; and unless we quicken our movements damnation will fall on the sacred cause for which so much gallant blood has flowed. I beg employers and workmen not to have 'Too Late' inscribed upon the portals of their workshops: that is my appeal.[20]

Although couched as an injunction to both sides of industry, this passage could also be seen as an oblique attack on Asquith's laid-back leadership style. Had Asquith himself been a more effective rhetorician of war he might have been less vulnerable to the Westminster intrigues that eventually drove him out of Downing Street.

As Prime Minister for the final two years of the war, Lloyd George needed his rhetorical skills as much as ever. As the head of a new coalition, he was dependent on the Conservatives for a majority; and, with disgruntled Asquithians waiting to pounce on any mis-step, he was always potentially vulnerable to any new crisis that might emerge. Lloyd George was helped by Asquith's seeming unwillingness – or inability – to strike effectively in debate. He recalled: 'When Asquith used to attack me on a wide front, I knew I was well away, and just sat back and waited my time. Later, I picked out what subjects suited me, dealt with them at great length and apologised for not dealing with the rest because of lack of time.'[21] He was also subject to assault from the left, which may have seemed particularly threatening at a time when Russia was in the throes of revolutionary turmoil. In November 1917, he made a speech in Paris 'of perhaps brutal frankness', as he put it himself. He said that the creation of the new Allied War Council had been delayed by 'national prejudice' and considerations of prestige among the Allies.[22] Although this was seen by many at the time as refreshingly honest, the Labour press in Britain did not disguise its contempt. According to the *Labour Leader*:

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> Mr. Lloyd George may soon find it convenient to resign his present position of responsibility for one of greater freedom, in which he will tell the world how he could have achieved victory if he had been allowed to direct the whole world according to his plans. But he cannot relieve himself of responsibility. He has been a Minister during the whole war, and he became Prime Minister a year ago with practically the powers of a Dictator, under a promise to reorganise the conduct of the war for victory. He may say that he undertook an impossible task, but he cannot transfer his responsibility to others.[23]

Although he would ultimately be hailed as 'The Man Who Won the War', during the conflict itself he was often subject to heavy criticism, which often focused on his 'dictatorial' ways. This was a charge which resulted in part from his neglect of parliament. *Hansard* records him as having spoken there on only twelve days in 1917, which was massively less active than Asquith had been as Prime Minister the previous year.

However, Lloyd George could still put on a stellar performance there when the occasion demanded. From the point of view of his political survival, probably the most dangerous moment of his premiership was the famous 'Maurice debate' of May 1918. He had been publicly accused of misleading parliament about troop levels in France prior to the Ludendorff offensive that began in March. Asquith demanded a Select Committee investigation, but made his case in a narrow, legalistic way. In his reply, Lloyd George made use of statistical evidence that was arguably dubious; at the very least he was highly selective about what he chose to present.[24] Regardless of whether or not the numbers were right, his speech was ostensibly based heavily on *logos*, with much discussion of which officials knew what when, and whether or not a Select Committee was the right place to judge such a question. But the comment of William Pringle, the hostile Liberal MP who spoke next, is interesting: 'The right hon. Gentleman has stated his case with all his accustomed dexterity, and he has made an appeal to the *emotions* of the House, an appeal which no man is able to make with greater skill and greater irrelevance than himself.'[25] Lloyd George did indeed use *pathos* when he argued that the controversy was undermining national unity and impeding the war effort: 'I really beg and implore, for our common country, the fate of which is in the balance now and in the next few weeks, that there should be an end of this sniping.'[26] He also used *ethos*, both when he presented himself as a busy man being forced to deal with a dangerous distraction, and when he assaulted the character of Sir Frederick Maurice, the dissident General who had breached military discipline by taking his allegations to the press. He pointed out, devastatingly, that the disputed figures had been provided by Maurice's own department. The combination of techniques was highly effective, and the government won the vote by a big majority. Cecil Harmsworth, an MP who was a member of Lloyd George's personal secretariat, noted in his diary: 'Ll.G. in first-rate fighting trim, reduces the Opposition to speechlessness.' Harmsworth added presciently: 'One unhappy result may be the definite splitting of the Liberal Party.'[27]

It is usual to regard war rhetoric from the point of view of domestic political management and of maintaining the morale of the citizenry. Yet speeches had another function too, that of international diplomacy. This was not only a question of appealing to allies and neutrals for support. Public rhetoric was a way of speaking to the enemy, either in an effort to intimidate them psychologically, or to put out peace feelers. The latter had to be done in such a way as to avoid showing weakness, given that speeches were ripe for propaganda exploitation by the other side. Lloyd George's efforts to carry out this balancing act can be seen in his War Aims speech of 5 January 1918. The context for this was provided by the peace negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. Count Czernin, Austria-Hungary's foreign minister and spokesman for the Central

Powers, had suggested that they would be prepared to make 'a general peace without compulsory annexations and without contributions' (i.e. indemnities). This type of language was acceptable to the Bolsheviks, but Czernin's condition was that Russia's allies also agreed.[28] Even though it did not appear to be a bona fide peace offer, it was not a statement that the British could allow to pass without comment. As Lloyd George put it shortly before his speech:

> We ought to take advantage of it to issue such a declaration of our own war aims as would maintain our own public opinion, and, if possible, lower that of the enemy. In fact, the view to which the War Cabinet inclined was to issue a declaration of our war aims which went to the extreme limit of concession, and which would show to our own people and to our Allies, as well as to the peoples of Austria, Turkey, and even Germany, that our object was not to destroy the enemy nations.[29]

Woodward has suggested that Lloyd George appeared to at least entertain 'the idea of a compromise peace with the enemy based on the sacrifice of Russia', although this 'did not dominate his thoughts during this period'.[30] This is plausible but, overall, the speech should be seen more as a public relations gambit than a genuine effort at peace. Lloyd George did not believe that the Germans could accept terms of the kind that the British were bound to insist upon. His statement, then, 'should be regarded rather as a war move than as a peace move'.[31] To his confidants, he said afterwards 'I *went as near peace as I could*', explaining that the speech 'was a counter-offensive against the German peace terms with a view to appealing to the German people and detaching the Austrians'.[32]

The speech was made to trade union delegates at Central Hall, Westminster. This choice of audience allowed Lloyd George to reach out to his left-wing critics, including those who were demanding progressive peace aims, by appearing to take them into his confidence. In terms of *ethos*, he presented himself as the leader of a united nation, who had secured the agreement of both Asquith and former Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for his initiative. He claimed to be 'speaking not merely the mind of the Government but of the nation and of the Empire as a whole'. There was also much use of *logos*, in the form of detailed argument about what kinds of terms would be acceptable. But there was, of course, also *pathos*, with justifications for Britain's past and present actions being wrapped up in emotive language. The Germans, at the outset, had 'violated public law' and 'ruthlessly trampled' on treaty obligations. 'We had to join the struggle or stand aside and see Europe go under and brute force triumph over public right and international justice.'[33] As Lloyd George had predicted, the Germans viewed his proposed terms as unacceptable. They seem to have found the support of Labour's Arthur Henderson for the speech to be a particularly bitter blow.[34] But as Lloyd George must have hoped, his approach was warmly received in America. Although he spoke a few days before President Woodrow Wilson revealed his celebrated 'Fourteen Points', the broad outlines of Wilson's approach to the peace were already known. Some unnamed US officials quoted by the *New York Times* 'noted that even President Wilson's ideas were developed more sharply [by Lloyd George] than he himself had expressed them'.[35]

Immediately after the war's end, Lloyd George faced the challenge of a general election. The future treatment of Germany and the extent to which the Allies might extract reparations were key issues in the campaign. As Kenneth O. Morgan has argued, Lloyd George cannot be convicted of pure and sustained rabble-rousing jingoism.[36] During a speech at Bristol on 11 December 1918, for example, he said that 'Germany must pay to the utmost limit of her capacity', but also – using *logos* – stressed that there were limits to that capacity and it was unlikely in practice that Britain could expect to receive every penny. His *ethos* as he presented it here was that of a man who throughout the whole war had 'never misled the public' and who did not want to raise false hopes. But however hard he worked to establish this, it is clear that the crowds were most affected by his appeals to *pathos*, as when he said that those who had started the war 'must pay to the uttermost farthing, and we shall search their pockets for it (laughter and cheers)'. The reservations faded into the background.[37] Churchill's later verdict was that 'In the hot squalid rush of the event he [Lloyd George] endeavoured to give satisfaction to mob-feeling and press chorus by using language which was in harmony with the prevailing sentiment, but which contained in every passage some guarding phrase, some qualification, which afterwards would leave statesmanship unchained'.[38] This aspect of the campaign, then, represented an unsuccessful effort at expectations management that would have serious repercussions during the Versailles conference and after. The seeds of disillusion were sown at the moment of Lloyd George's greatest triumph.

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In conclusion, it is appropriate to draw some comparisons with Churchill in the Second World War. None of Lloyd George's war speeches have entered popular memory, unlike Churchill's great orations of 1940. In part, this may simply because we lack recordings that can be repeated over and over again on documentaries. This fact reminds us that Lloyd George was operating in a more primitive technological environment. If he had been able to broadcast to the masses he might well have done so successfully, but in practice he was always addressing the bulk of the British population – and international opinion – indirectly, via the press. This may have required a different rhetorical approach. It is certainly true that Churchill's speeches have a literary quality that Lloyd George's lack, but we should not therefore rush to the conclusion that their political utility was superior. As Morgan puts it, 'Churchill spoke to history; Lloyd George spoke to his listeners.'[39] Nor should we put Churchill's speeches on a pedestal and assume that – as legend would have it – practically everyone who heard them was thrilled and inspired. In fact, they were the subject of more criticism and dissent than is generally believed.[40] And if Churchill had more conspicuous triumphs than Lloyd George, he also had more flops and failures. Lloyd George made no equivalent

of the 1945 'Gestapo' broadcast; unlike Churchill, he won his general election.

We do not, however, have the same type of survey evidence for the First World War as for the Second; therefore popular reactions to Lloyd George are harder to judge. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that, even if they have not gained the plaudits of posterity, Lloyd George's speeches served their immediate purposes in a way that many politicians would envy. It is to be hoped that this article may serve as a call for a more systematic study of the origins, delivery and reception of the rhetoric of an undeniably brilliant war leader.

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1 In a letter to President Woodrow Wilson of 22 February 1917, US ambassador Walter H. Page wrote that Lloyd George 'has been called the illiterate Prime Minister, "because he never reads or writes."' This was obviously an extreme comment, or a joke, which no one can have imagined to be literally true, but Lloyd George did prefer conversation to reading as means of obtaining information, and was quite reluctant to put pen to paper. B. J. Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, Vol. III (Heinemann 1925), p. 371.

2 Kenneth O. Morgan, 'Lloyd George's Premiership: A Study in "Prime Ministerial Government"', *Historical Journal* , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 130–57.

3 See especially: Manfred Weidhorn, *Churchill's Rhetoric and Political Discourse* (University Press of America, 1987); David Cannadine, *In Churchill's Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern Britain* (Penguin, 2003), Chapter 4; Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (Palgrave, 2005), Chapter 2; and Peter Clarke, *Mr Churchill's Profession: Statesman, Orator, Writer* (Bloomsbury, 2012).

4 Iain Mclean, *Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair* (Oxford University Press, 2001), Chapters 6 & 7.

5 Lord Morgan, 'Lloyd George', lecture of 11 Jan. 2011, in Philip Norton (ed.), *Eminent Parliamentarians: The Speaker's Lectures* (Biteback, 2012).

6 L. Brooks Hill, 'David Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions: A Study of His Speaking Tour of Industrial Centers', *Southern Speech Journal*, Vol. 36, Issue 4 (1971), pp. 312–23; David R. Woodward, 'The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims Speech', *The Historian*, 34 (1971), pp. 22–39.

7 Hill, 'David Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions', p. 322.

8 Morgan, 'Lloyd George'.

9 Colin Cross (ed.), *Life with Lloyd George: The Diary of A.J. Sylvester 1931–45* (Macmillan, 1975), p. 213 (entry for 26 July 1938).

10 Robert Roberts, *A Ragged Schooling* (Flamingo, 1984), p. 52.

11 Jon Lawrence, *Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair* (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 55.

12 Frank Owen to Thomas Blackburn, 6 Aug. 1952, Thomas Blackburn Papers, University of Exeter. Owen – who was writing a biography of Lloyd George – was reporting information from Frank Whittaker, who had worked with Riddell after the First World War.

13 Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

14 Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert, *David Lloyd George: A Political Life: Organizer of Victory* 1912–16 (B.T. Batsford, 1992), p. 117.

15 'British Honour: Stirring Speech By Mr. Lloyd George', *The Times*, 20 Sept. 1914.

16 The speech is reproduced in Frances Stevenson (ed.), *Through Terror to Triumph: Speeches and Pronouncements of the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, MP, Since the Beginning of the War* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1915), pp. 1–15.

17 John Grigg, *Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916* (Penguin, 2002), p. 171.

18 Beriah G. Evans, 'Mr. Lloyd George as Minister of Democracy', *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1915, pp. 884–96, at 896; Hill, 'David Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions', p. 313.

19 Gilbert, *David Lloyd George*, pp. 246–50.

20 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 77 20 Dec. 1915, col. 121.

21 Cross, *Life with Lloyd George*, p. 213 (entry for 26 July 1938).

22 'Allied War Council. Mr. Ll. George On Strategy', *The Times*, 13 Nov. 1917.

23 Quoted in D.J. Shackleton, 'The Labour Situation: Report from the Ministry of Labour for the week ending the 21st November, 1917', GT 2176, CAB 24/33, The National Archives, Kew, London (henceforward TNA).

24 John Grigg, *Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916–1918* (Penguin, 2003), p. 494.

25 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 105, 9 May 1918, col. 2374. Emphasis added.

26 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 105, 9 May 1918, col. 2374.

27 Cecil Harmsworth diary, 9 May 1918, Cecil Harmsworth Papers, University of Exeter.

28 'Czernin Makes the Offer', *New York Times*, 28 Dec. 1917.

29 War Cabinet minutes, 3 Jan. 1918, 11.30 a.m., CAB 23/5, TNA.

30 Woodward, 'The Origins and Intent', p. 35.

31 War Cabinet minutes, 3 Jan. 1918, 5 p.m., CAB 23/5, TNA.

32 John M. McEwen, *The Riddell Diaries 1908–23* (Athlone Press, 1986), p. 212 (entry for 5 Jan. 1918).

33 'British War Aims: Mr. Lloyd George's Statement', *The Times*, 7 Jan. 1918.

34 'Berlin Surprised Over Henderson', *New York Times*, 10 Jan. 1918. In August 1917, Henderson had lost his seat in the War Cabinet on account of his support for Labour Party participation in an international socialist congress in Sweden, at which Germans were to be represented.

35 'Officials Silent on Premier's Speech', *New York Times*, 6 Jan. 1918.

36 Kenneth O. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918–1922* (Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 39–41.

37 'Prime Minister On Conscription', *The Times*, 12 Dec. 1918.

38 Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, Part IV: The Aftermath*, in *The Collected Works of Sir Winston Churchill*, 34 vols. (Library of Imperial History/Hamlyn, 1973–76), p. 49.

39 Morgan, 'Lloyd George'.

40 This is one of the themes of my forthcoming book *The Roar of the Lion: The Making of Churchill's World War II Speeches*.