

Critics of Empire

Was J. R. Seeley in reality the apologist for imperialism he is often regarded as? Jon Parry examines Seeley's best-selling *The Expansion of England*.


John Robert Seeley, Liberalism and empire

IN 1883, A historical survey of the British empire became a publishing hit: 80,000 copies were sold in two years. The book was *The Expansion of England* by John Robert Seeley, an academic historian who had been Regius Professor of History at the University of Cambridge since 1869. The timing was excellent. Its publication coincided with newspaper excitement about the European competition for territory in Africa – the ‘Scramble for Africa’. The book played an important role in explaining the empire to the British public in attractive terms, and therefore popularising the imperial idea in the late nineteenth century. It had a major impact on the thought of Lord Rosebery, who arranged for Seeley to be awarded the KCMG while he was Liberal prime minister in 1894. After Seeley's early death in 1895, there was a campaign to commemorate his legacy as a public intellectual. In Cambridge, a fund was established in his name, which was attached to the library of the Cambridge History Faculty. Until 2008, his imprint was visible in the study of history in Cambridge in another way too: the main undergraduate course on territories outside Europe and the United States was called ‘The Expansion of Europe’.

In recent years, there has been a lot of historical interest in nineteenth-century ideas of empire, and specifically in writers, like Seeley,

who presented a liberal vision of it. These liberal imperialists have come in for heavy criticism for the selective zeal with which they advocated the imperial project. They presented it as a beneficial process that could spread civilisation, while giving very little thought to the native populations of the conquered lands. Seeley, for example, celebrated the determination with which British emigrants had settled on ‘comparatively empty’ lands in North America and Australasia and turned them into thriving and productive farming communities. He assumed that the native races there lacked the resources to compete economically or technologically, so he had no moral qualms about their surrender to European dominance.¹ As a result, he has been swept up in the recent culture wars about the benefits and failings of empire. In 2021, Cambridge students began a campaign to remove his name from the history library, citing him as an apologist for colonialism and British imperial conquest.

It is worth exploring in more detail what motivated Seeley to write about empire, not in order to justify any of his views but so as to understand his preoccupations and those of other liberal intellectuals who thought like him. *The Expansion of England* is best seen as a product of his broader anxieties about Britain's prospects as a political and moral



community. It was accidental that he became best known as an imperialist; he never visited the empire and seems to have given very little thought to it until the late 1870s. Even after that, he was not among those who advocated a new empire in Africa.² He was also more pessimistic about the prospects of his liberal vision of empire than is often assumed. His book came out of a lecture course which he devised as a pedagogical tool to explain to his students what was unsatisfactory about contemporary party politics and contemporary ways of writing history. He aimed to show them that both parties, Liberal and Conservative, had perverted history in order to fit the needs of modern political sloganeering, and that students had a duty, when they grew up, to lead a more rigorous public debate about Britain's duties and requirements as a world power.

Sir John Robert Seeley (1834–95) (Photo by W. & D. Downey, 1870s; © National Portrait Gallery, London)

The battle of values in Britain

Seeley's main aim was for his students to gain a proper historical perspective on the world around them. He wanted to persuade them that British expansion across the North American continent, and the harnessing of its enormous natural resources, was the most important story in modern British history. He insisted that the developments in domestic policy since 1688, on which too many of them focused, were trivial in comparison.³ That was why he criticised Cambridge's emphasis on narrowly British rather than extra-European history.

He wanted students to see the colonies as a set of communities of Britons who

had settled in underdeveloped parts of the world and had cultivated them with their skill and capital. His lectures focused on Britain's expansion into North America and Australasia because he saw the settlements formed there as extensions of its domestic regime, which would benefit from the same liberal values that should be applied at home. The underlying theme of his public writing during these decades was that public men in Britain should cherish its free institutions, and work towards national social progress based on class harmony and shared moral values. Therefore, he wanted the same process to apply to British settlements abroad. They should not be viewed as mere historical acquisitions, which could easily be abandoned; they were an integral part of the nation, and a national responsibility.

Together with most liberal intellectuals of his generation (he was born in 1834), Seeley's main concern was how to preserve Britain's public values at a time of rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, and political change, especially once most urban workingmen were given the vote in the 1867 Reform Act. Teaching the urban democracy the need to cohere as a national community became one of his major preoccupations. His evangelical background left him with the assumption that the Protestant religion was an essential component of Britishness, but, together with most liberals of his generation, he turned against the dogmatism and divisive Calvinism of traditional evangelicals. Instead, he followed F. D. Maurice and other broad churchmen in hoping that the nation could rally around a Christian morality broadly based on humanity, family love, and service. (An earlier book of his, *Ecce Homo*, had stressed the centrality of humanitarian social teaching to Christianity.) Seeley, along with most broad churchmen, rejected the Protestant Nonconformist view that voluntary effort alone would ensure social harmony and progress. Instead, he

insisted that the state must itself embody and promote high moral ideals, consensually. So, there should be an established state Church, and compulsory teaching of an undogmatic religion in schools. Similarly, he maintained that the emigration of British subjects would not automatically lead to happy colonies. The British state needed to oversee their affairs and to cultivate their loyalty to the Crown, even while settlers developed self-governing expertise locally.⁴

When Seeley returned to Cambridge as Regius Professor in 1869, after a period teaching Classics in London, he was already known as an advocate of a logical approach to understanding the past, and as a critic of romantic and moralistic styles of history. He saw the role as a chance to give students a more rigorous and socially useful historical training. In his inaugural lecture, in 1870, he urged much more focus on recent and contemporary history – at the expense of classical and renaissance studies – because it had most to teach the students of the day. Cambridge, he thought, had a general mission of political education, and a more specific one to train up future politicians and civil servants. The Cambridge history degree course was set up in 1873, in response to the government's decision in 1870 to make entry to the home civil service depend on competitive exams, including one in history. Similar exams were already used for the Indian civil service, established in 1853. So, several lecture courses were put on mainly as preparation for these examinations, including Seeley's lectures that became *The Expansion of England*. These were two sets of eight lectures, one in Michaelmas 1881 on Britain in the Americas, and one in Lent 1882 on Britain in India. They embodied Seeley's principle that history should involve 'large considerations': students should be introduced to big subjects and taught to draw useful lessons.⁵ He wanted them particularly to think about the duties of the state: it was 'the

noblest object of human contemplation, the most vital subject for human enquiry'.⁶

Britain's expansion overseas was a timely subject because domestic politics had become very partisan in the 1870s. Mass national parties were developing in order to organise the expanded electorate, and the Liberal and Conservative party leaders, Gladstone and Disraeli, were becoming semi-presidential figures in the popular imagination. Foreign and imperial issues were at the heart of this party controversy. Should Britain fight Russia in a war over the Ottoman empire, or the Afghan War to defend India? What should it do about the rise of Germany, united in 1871, and the United States, reunited after the Civil War in 1865? Could it afford to remain uninvolved in all these global tensions and just to focus on humanitarianism and on trade? In 1878, Gladstone wrote an article called 'England's mission', for the *Nineteenth Century*. Politicians on all sides pontificated about what this mission should involve – but had very different answers. Many Liberals upheld the legacy of Richard Cobden, the 'Manchester school' and the peace movement – that Britain should keep out of wars, should not spend vast sums on ships and soldiers, and should just aspire to trade with the whole world, benefiting itself and others. The non-interventionist foreign policy of Gladstone's first government (1868–1874) encouraged the impression that these Cobdenite principles were taking over the Liberal Party, and that the Liberals no longer wished to spend any money on the defence of British colonies. Meanwhile the Liberal press started to make an alternative claim: that the Conservative leader Disraeli was beguiling the expanded electorate into an aggressive policy, of 'imperialism', or 'jingoism', based on blind celebration of English greatness and English national destiny. In the late 1870s, therefore, a

culture war developed about Britain's place in the world.

Seeley hated the crude divisiveness of partisan politics, so damaging to national harmony, and hated this culture war in particular. He was on holiday in 1879 when he had the idea for a course of lectures to correct these misunderstandings, telling Oscar Browning that he felt a heavy responsibility to work out

His lectures clearly identified 'the two schools of opinion among us with respect to our Empire': the 'bombastic' and the 'pessimistic'. Disraeli and the Tories were bombastic romantics ...

and explain the right idea of Britain's development.⁷ His lectures clearly identified 'the two schools of opinion among us with respect to our Empire': the 'bombastic' and the 'pessimistic'. Disraeli and the Tories were bombastic romantics, talking the language of heroism and honour, and 'lost in wonder and ecstasy at the empire's immense dimensions'. The Cobdenite view was similarly extreme in the other direction, seeing the empire as a useless burden and immoral excrescence, 'founded in aggression and rapacity'.⁸ The popular moralistic historians of the day, such as T. B. Macaulay and Charles Kingsley, had helped politicians to slip into these misconceptions of Britain's position in the world, through their emphasis on racialism. They had lauded the 'genius of the Anglo-Saxon race', cultivating the idea that the English had a unique talent for government, a unique understanding of liberty, and a unique mission to spread civilisation.⁹ They had spread the comforting myth that the world was naturally developing the way the English wanted – through trade, and through admiration for the English constitution.

Seeley's lectures critiqued all these race-based rhetorical boasts about England's mission. His rejection of racialist lines of

argument is ironic, given that his critics today now accuse him of racialism in another sense – his inadequate attention to the existence of indigenous people. The second set of lectures, on India, mainly attacked the view that Britain had a right to rule India because of British racial superiority to the Indians. The first set asked how far this comforting myth of British racial superiority explained anything about British expansion into the American continent, which had ended with British dominance of Atlantic trade, and the emergence of a new Anglo-Saxon power, the United States.

The Americas

Seeley insisted that it was unscientific to explain this ‘Anglo-Saxon’ dominance in terms of racial factors. Such generalisations derived from the error of studying ‘history only in single states’.¹⁰ Comparative history – the simultaneous study of the European empires on the American continent – punctured lazy claims of English racial superiority. England had become the world’s greatest economic power, but not because Englishmen had ‘the blood of the Vikings ... nor the industrial genius of the Anglo-Saxon’, as Macaulay, Kingsley or E. A. Freeman might say. It was because of economics and geopolitics. England came to dominate Atlantic trade, and imported and exported essential factory materials, while France and Spain were bogged down in wars for supremacy on the European continent. England dominated the trade of the New World not because she ‘surpassed the others in daring or invention or energy’, but because she was the country ‘least hampered by the Old World’.¹¹

Seeley also showed how all the European empires had made bad mistakes in the Americas, with the result that they had lost most of their territory. Spain, Portugal, France, and Holland had been driven out of the continental landmass almost completely, while Britain


just retained Canada and a few Central American footholds. Through greed, the Europeans had misjudged how empires work. The fundamental mistake was Spain’s original vision of the New World as an opportunity to be exploited: ‘an estate which was to be worked for the benefit of the mother-country’.¹² The Spanish in South America assumed they could subordinate local peoples by force, and did not need to develop a genuine community of interest – but this strategy did not succeed, because they were massively outnumbered by locals. Eighteenth-century Britons behaved equally badly: they led ‘the monstrous and enormous atrocities of the slave-trade’.¹³ Britain exploited its American subjects through a protectionist colonial system designed to extract their resources and tax them heavily. Like Spain, Britain treated the colonists as ‘possessions’, not as ‘extensions of us’. We ‘fine[d] the colonists for the benefit of the home traders’.¹⁴ If imperialism is defined as a system of exploitation, Seeley was one of its greatest critics.

To Seeley, therefore, the rebellion of the thirteen American colonies was justified. Their free institutions, and a common religious mindset founded on their church communities, had helped them to create a successful and dynamic polity.¹⁵ The United States now challenged British power. The advent of steam and electricity also changed geopolitical calculations, allowing more distant places to be brought under one government. British world power was based on its navy, but now it was possible to envisage both the United States and Russia becoming vast land powers.¹⁶

This was the basis of Seeley’s disagreement with Cobdenite Liberals, and Gladstone. He thought that they took a complacent view of the rise of the United States, because they regarded Americans as ‘kin beyond sea’, as Gladstone called them in another of his 1878 articles, this time for the North American

Review. Seeley rejected this romantic racialist argument about innate British affinity with the United States. In hard-headed power terms, he argued, the United States were a threat to Britain, because they possessed the ingredients of superpowerdom – they started with deep-rooted religious belief, developed distinct economic strengths, and expanded into new land. Migrants from other countries settled in the United States and became Americans. Even Canadians modified their behaviour from when they were in England, and started to think like Americans, because of commonalities of land settlement, climate, trade, and culture.¹⁷

Seeley could easily imagine Canada leaving the British connection and joining the United States, especially now that American unity had been re-established at the end of the Civil War. Canada had been enlarged into a transcontinental country between 1867 and 1871, but many British people, following Cobden, thought that its separate existence was unsustainable, and its defence (against the United States) unnecessarily expensive for British taxpayers. The radical politician Charles Dilke became a leading proponent of this view. In 1868, he published a book called *Greater Britain*, which discussed the same phenomenon as Seeley, the spread of British political and moral values through overseas settlement. Dilke, however, defined this Greater Britain in cultural and racial terms, in terms of English-speaking identity, rather than in terms of political structures. For him, a strong United States was an essential player in a future liberal world, so its absorption of Canada would be beneficial. Seeley's broad church statist philosophy led him to take issue with Dilke.¹⁸ For Seeley, 'Greater Britain' had to mean the extension of the English state and government, not just the voluntary expansion of the English race.¹⁹ North America was a British problem, not an opportunity. Britain had to create a genuine community of interest



Seeley, portrait by Clara Ewald (1859–1948)

with the Canadians, in order to weaken a future United States challenge to British global power. Seeley's point was that, on the American continent, Britain must think about power, not race.

Seeley's first set of eight lectures therefore concluded that the British had misgoverned their American territories in the past, by pursuing exploitation rather than community solidarity, and were in danger of mishandling what remained of them now, through complacency about a natural liberal affinity with the United States.

India

When the students reassembled after Christmas, Seeley turned his fire on all those who used 'Oriental bombast' to claim that Britain had a natural destiny to run an Indian empire.²⁰ This was clearly an attack on Disraeli's Tories, but also on the smugness of Whig historians like Macaulay, once an administrator in India, who had assumed that



Images of Empire:

Left: 'The Rhodes Colossus' – cartoon by Edward Linley Sambourne, published in *Punch* after Cecil Rhodes announced plans for a railway connection and telegraph line from Cape Town to Cairo in 1892
Right: 'Justice' – the British suppression of the Indian rebellion; a print by Sir John Tenniel in a September 1857 issue of *Punch*

English values would naturally win out there. Macaulay and other triumphalists implied that India had been conquered through English superiority, the 'heroic qualities' of the English race, and their 'natural genius for government'. Macaulay's essay on Robert Clive had attributed Clive's victories to the abilities of 'the mighty children of the sea', whereas Seeley stressed the contribution of the Indian troops, the sepoy.²¹

Seeley showed that 'what is called the conquest of India by the English' can be explained 'without supposing the natives of India to be below other races, just as it does not force us to regard the English as superior to other races'.²² Actually Britain had never conquered India, because it faced the

same problems in India as the Spanish had in South America. British India was an 'artificial' empire because the locals massively outnumbered the British, and there was no way they could be permanently assimilated. The climate made large-scale British settlement impossible.²³ Britain had subordinated India by exploiting divisions among Indians and arming some against others. The same tactic explained the defeat of the 1857 uprising against British rule. This was not difficult, because there were so many different loyalties and religions. If a nationalism could emerge in India with the same force as in Italy, 'the English Power ... must succumb at once'.²⁴

Seeley showed that the British had misgoverned India, just as they had misgoverned

America. In the process, however, they had destroyed the authority and capacity of the old ruling classes and had undermined the hold of the native religions. In other words, they had removed any basis for a successful indigenous political community. This allowed him to argue that 'to withdraw our Government from a country which is dependent on it and which we have made incapable of depending upon anything else, would be the most inexcusable of all conceivable crimes'. 'There are some deeds which, though they had been better not done, cannot be undone.'²⁵ On the bright side, perhaps Britain had a providential task to build something better from these mistakes.

There is no reason to doubt his genuine embarrassment and regret at the destructive impact of British power in India. He had no detailed prescriptions for how modern Britons might tackle the challenge which they had inherited: India was hardly a specialism of his, and his concern was to cultivate a sense of responsibility in his students, who might become future Indian civil servants. His lectures repeatedly warned them against complacency in the task. We should avoid the 'optimistic commonplaces of the newspaper'. Our Western civilisation 'is perhaps not absolutely the glorious thing we like to imagine it'. The British were destroying bad things and good things together; sometimes it was not clear what good things they were creating.²⁶

The saving grace was that Britain had time to develop beneficial policies, because there was currently no Indian nationalist movement, so the immediate and urgent question was whether it could be defended from Russia. Britain could probably cope with a Russian invasion or with an internal mutiny, but not with both at the same time.²⁷ Here again Seeley revealed himself to be a liberal. He insisted that Russia was less of a threat than the dynamic and coherent United

States, and less than militarist Tories pretended with their war talk, because it was a chaos of warring entities; it was less of a national unity than it pretended. 'If [Greater Britain] will not be stronger than the United States, we may say with confidence that it will be far stronger than the great conglomeration of Slavs, Germans, Turcomans and Armenians, of Greek Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Mussulmans and Buddhists, which we call Russia.'²⁸

Conclusion

The publication of *The Expansion of England* made Seeley a public figure. As one contemporary wrote, it also 'brought the weight of Liberal authority' to the defence of empire. His high-minded vision of empire as an extension of the domestic family, and domestic responsibilities, made it easier for liberal-minded people to identify publicly with the cause – as did endorsements from rising stars such as Rosebery.²⁹ In 1884–85, many Liberal Party supporters were keen to find a way of making a greater commitment to empire, at a time when Gladstone's government was enduring intense criticism from the pro-empire press for what seemed to be half-hearted policies in Sudan and southern Africa. As a result, the first of a number of cross-party campaigns for some form of imperial consolidation was launched. An Imperial Federation League was founded, and Seeley agreed to be chair of the Cambridge branch. No doubt he hoped that such a movement would educate public opinion to take the right view of empire. But his commitment to the movement remained at an abstract level: he did not get involved in detailed discussions about inter-colonial constitutional schemes or tariff policies. They came to nothing, in any case. Then the severe split in the Liberal Party in 1886 over Irish home rule triggered the defection of most of those keenest on empire, including Seeley. He

remained a Liberal Unionist for the rest of his life. Of those who stayed in the Liberal Party, a minority took up the banner of ‘Liberal Impe-

Studying Seeley reminds us that idealistic liberal visions of empire have very often criticised its illiberal realities nearly as strongly as anti-imperialists have done.

rialism’ in the 1890s, led by Rosebery and Edward Grey.³⁰

Seeley was a utopian visionary in some ways, but about politics in general more than about empire. His core vision was of an active state cultivating a national humanitarian community spirit, in pursuit of the general good. Though he acknowledged that this was an ideal, he felt that there were enough examples in British history of beneficial character-driven enterprise to make it plausible. The same values could in principle sustain an ‘expansion of England’ which would leave the temperate regions of the world better governed than they had been. But this was not the same as saying that the British empire had been, or was, an admirable regime. Seeley’s message was not that the empire was a great family; it was that it would survive only if it became one. It would fall unless British administrators worked out how to create genuine communities of imperial sentiment in Canada and India alike.

Seeley was, therefore, a great critic of the mistakes made by past imperialists. He condemned the exploitation of local peoples, and the lack of concern with community or humanity, which had marked British policy in America and in India in the eighteenth century. He was also a great critic of the racist language of politicians and historians, which he blamed for the two main errors in modern imperial policy. The fallacy of ‘sheer natural superiority’³¹ explained the unjustified arrogance with which many, especially on the right, regarded Britain’s position in India,

but it also underpinned the complacency with which many others, especially on the left, approached the question of abandoning Canada and other strategic colonies.

Seeley’s vision was itself a piece of history – it was a relic of the idealism of his generation of

young liberal intellectuals of the 1850s. Disciples of Thomas Arnold and F. D. Maurice, they tasked themselves with trying to find a new basis for national unity in response to the waning of landed power and the declining potency of evangelicalism. They hoped that free trade, advances in knowledge, religious pluralism, and family ideals might provide the building-blocks for greater class harmony and national economic and moral progress. By the late 1870s, however, there no longer seemed much hope of national unity; by the mid-1880s, division loomed everywhere. Like most liberal intellectuals, Seeley was by now very pessimistic about Britain’s political future. He blamed the manufactured divisions and misleading language of the democratic party system – the ‘interminable scurrilous brawl’ of parties, weaving a ‘web of falsehood and fallacy’.³² In particular, he blamed Gladstone’s Liberal Party which, by adopting Irish home rule and seeming indifferent to Church establishments, had positioned itself ‘in opposition to all the fundamental principles upon which not only the State, but morality and religion rest’.³³ Politicians were also failing to respond to the global challenges to British national power represented by the United States, Germany, and Russia, and by changes in commerce and technology.³⁴ It must be the task of the next generation of civil servants and politicians – his lecture audience – to work out how a sea power like Britain could tackle these challenges on the one hand, and the unfortunate legacy of a misgoverned India on the other.

For Seeley, the history lecturer was a preacher, charged with guiding the young how to approach their duties.³⁵ The teaching of history involved a political lesson, but also a methodological one. Historians themselves needed to abandon complacent arrogance about the British national story, and instead to study comparative history hard-headedly. As his student J. R. Tanner remarked, Seeley insisted that his classes must reject sloppy thinking, and avoid ‘fallacies in fine phrases’.³⁶ They should study power, economics, and geography with a clear head, and take these lessons into public life. Seeley wanted to professionalise the study of history. In fact, he only took professionalisation so far: he had not been trained as a historian himself and did not base his conclusions on detailed archival study. As a result, his legacy within the historical profession, and in Cambridge, was less, in the long run, than that of younger and more scholarly colleagues such as F. W. Maitland.

Seeley would not have wanted to be seen as a diehard defender of the empire as it actually was. It is best to view him as a moralistic visionary about what it needed to be, and as an academic critic of dominant, partisan and racially motivated interpretations of England’s mission. Studying him reminds us that idealistic liberal visions of empire have very often criticised its illiberal realities nearly as strongly as anti-imperialists have done.

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- 1 J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two courses of lectures* (London, 1883), pp. 47–8.
- 2 Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, NJ, 2007), p. 171.
- 3 Seeley, *Expansion*, pp. 120–2.

- 4 Richard Shannon, ‘John Robert Seeley and the idea of a National Church’, in R. Robson (ed.), *Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain* (London, 1967), pp. 236–67.
- 5 J. R. Tanner, ‘John Robert Seeley’, *English Historical Review*, 10 (1895), p. 510.
- 6 This was H. A. L. Fisher’s summary of his philosophy, in ‘Sir John Seeley’, *Fortnightly Review*, 60 (1896), p. 183.
- 7 Deborah Wormell, *Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 7–8.
- 8 Seeley, *Expansion*, p. 293.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 80; see Wormell, *Sir John Seeley*, pp. 126, 130–1.
- 10 Seeley, *Expansion*, p. 98.
- 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 97.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp. 136–7.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 74–5.
- 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 50, 155–6.
- 18 Seeley seems to have revised his thinking on this point: in an earlier lecture, of 1872, he had accepted Dilke’s main argument: Wormell, *Sir John Seeley*, 156.
- 19 Seeley, *Expansion*, pp. 42–3.
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 300–2.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 200–1, 218.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp. 205–6.
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 185.
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 233.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 196.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 305.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 291.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- 29 Peter Burroughs, ‘John Robert Seeley and British imperial history’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1 (1973), p. 205.
- 30 H. C. G. Matthew, *The Liberal Imperialists: The ideas and politics of a post-Gladstonian elite* (Oxford, 1973).
- 31 Seeley, *Expansion*, p. 295.
- 32 Seeley, ‘Ethics and religion’, *Fortnightly Review*, 45 (1889), p. 511.
- 33 Wormell, *Sir John Seeley*, p. 171.
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 102–3.
- 35 Burroughs, ‘John Robert Seeley’, p. 194.
- 36 Tanner, ‘John Robert Seeley’, pp. 507–8.